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Beyond Abstraction: Philosophy as a Practical Qualitative 
Research Method  
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In this paper, I take up a discussion of what philosophic method is, and 
why it should be viewed as an important qualitative research method. 
After clarifying the nature of philosophic method within the larger 
framework of social practices, I argue that philosophy is important to both 
practice and research, and I suggest that philosophers work in concert 
with other qualitative researchers. I argue that recently (relatively 
speaking) philosophy has been viewed with some understandable disdain 
among both practitioners and researchers as an enjoyable but abstract 
(and therefore useless) social practice. That perception can be fixed but 
only if philosophical research becomes once again explicitly relevant to 
practice (particularly educational practice). Finally, I provide a brief 
example of how philosophy can indeed be relevant to practice from a 
recent symposium that I participated in on reflection in service-learning 
education. Key Words: Philosophy, Qualitative Research, Research 
Method, John Dewey, Social Practice, Service-Learning, Educational 
Research, and History of Philosophy 
 
 
 Unfortunately, it was some time after the oral defense of my written qualifying 
examination that it hit me. Actually, John Dewey (and, yes, I did picture him 
cantankerously crawling from the grave to do so) hit me with it: “abstract.” That is what 
I should have said, and that is exactly what would have explained my “take” on 
philosophical “speculation” as a qualitative research methodology. Dr. Newman’s 
challenge to my written examination response (wherein I “dismissed” speculation as a 
tool for philosophical work) set my heart to racing as I “defended” my position. The 
ensuing rescue by another, more sympathetic, committee member set my mind to 
working. My rescuer (and committee chair) was, I slowly realized, completely right: 
speculation is a valuable philosophical activity. It is, rather, the abstract, disconnected, 
“aloof,” purely analytical, “other-worldly” philosophical inquiry that I find troublesome 
and that gives philosophers a bad name. As Dewey (1958) so clearly put it, abstraction 
practiced “in a bad sense to designate something which exclusively occupies a realm of 
its own without contact with the things of ordinary experience” (p. 6) is what allows 
other researchers to (understandably) tell us philosophers, “you can keep a knockin’, but 
you can’t come in.” Speculation, on the other hand, remains vital to the conception and 
practice of philosophy. It is, in fact, an important part of what Dewey called the 
“mediation” of experience; the stepping back from a problematic situation to hypothesize 
as to its solution. All successful research (and good thinking generally) has a valuable 
speculative aspect and philosophy is no exception.   
I left that examination room with an uneasy feeling-- the gnawing feeling that I 
really did not understand philosophical research method--and this after years of study 
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into the matter! The artificial, contrived, disingenuous problem of explaining to my 
doctoral committee how philosophy is indeed a useful research method immediately 
became a genuinely felt problem-to-be-solved. The purpose of this paper is to answer the 
troubling questions that arose from that examination: What exactly are philosophy’s 
methodological tools and subject matter? And, why should philosophical work be 
understood, at least in part, as a viable research method? Until I could fully answer these 
questions, the gnawing dissatisfaction would remain and my academic life would be at a 
standstill.  
Philosophy as a Social Practice 
 
As with all enduring human enterprises, philosophical endeavors are a part of the 
social experience that exists when one is born and that will continue on when one dies. 
Philosophy is, in this regard, an important social practice and further examination of it as 
such can guide, at least in part, an assessment of its structure and value as a research 
method. As Alasdair MacIntyre (1984) argues, a social practice is 
  
any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human 
activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized 
in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are 
appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the 
result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of 
the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended. (p. 187)  
 
This understanding makes clear what does and what does not count as a social 
practice. As an example, plopping a tomato plant into the ground is not a social practice, 
but the larger work of gardening certainly is. Relevant to the present problem of 
clarifying philosophical method, mere speculation is not a social practice; it is, rather, 
one tool that might be used as part of the social practice called philosophizing. In this 
way, all research methods fit the definition of a social practice and thereby have a 
specific type of structure to their work.  
As MacIntyre (1984) explains, any social practice “involves standards of 
excellence and obedience to rules as well as the achievement of goods” (p. 190). That is, 
social practices (such as research paradigms) take their cues from an established tradition 
to create a vision of what is desired for the future. In this, Macintyre provides a 
framework for discussing whether, and then how, philosophy is structured similarly to 
other more widely accepted and validated methods of research. Philosophy, as a general 
social practice, is not dissimilar in basic structure to the practice of gardening. As a 
gardener, I accept the procedures that have been shown to be successful from the 
gardening tradition and I accept the traditional goals of producing good vegetables and 
developing a closer relationship with the soil. I also adjust and make use of the tradition 
as it relates to my particular gardening situation, making changes as problems arise and 
in so doing improve the practice as it relates to my needs. Ethnography, as an example of 
a widely accepted and validated research method, has a particular set of tools that are 
used for understanding a particular type of experience. It is a social practice that 
comfortably fits into the research method category. In the same way, philosophy must be 
shown to operate in a fashion that is similar (if not identical) in structure to other research 
methods if its place as a viable method is to be comfortably secured. 
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Endless numbers of professional philosophers have attempted to explain exactly 
what it is that philosophers do and exactly what it is that philosophers study and to what 
end. This has been particularly true in the last hundred years or so as more and more 
disciplines have “graduated” out of philosophy (psychology, for example) to operate in 
their own realms leaving philosophers, in the opinion of some, with little or nothing to 
do. As Lewis Feuer (1969) said it, “not only have we had an end of ideology in America 
and an end of God in theology, be we have also witnessed evidently an end of 
philosophy” (p. 35).  
In explaining what philosophy is and what philosophers do, scholars such as 
Feuer (1969) are at the same time trying to return this essential social practice to its place 
as a qualitatively relevant enterprise. Some of these qualifying attempts came early in the 
continuing struggle. William Hocking (1929), for example, defined philosophy as 
operating on two different levels. First, philosophy can be understood simply as “the sum 
of our beliefs” (p. 3). This definition might be described as the “lay” definition: Most 
humans, if not all of us, do make decisions and take action based on a set of beliefs. 
However, as a social practice and research methodology, philosophy is much more than 
this. Hocking explains  
 
When we speak of philosophy as a science, however, we mean the 
examination of belief--thinking one’s way to a well-grounded set of 
beliefs. Philosophy holds that we cannot, as human beings, remain 
satisfied with dumb tenacity in holding our beliefs.(p. 10)  
 
Other philosophers of merit have slightly different descriptions of philosophy’s 
process and purpose. Sydney Hook (1969), for example, describes philosophy as having 
three major aims: (1) helping to understand “the history and nature of our civilization”; 
(2) making “explicit our allegiances to the ideals in behalf of which we are prepared to 
live, to fight, sometimes even to die”; and (3) achieving “awareness and self-
consciousness” through the use of logical analysis (p. 52). Harold Titus (1969) writes 
that, “in a general sense, a person’s philosophy is the sum of his fundamental beliefs and 
convictions” (p. 24). He fleshes out his definition by listing five specific views of 
philosophy that include philosophy as a personal attitude toward life, a method of 
reflective thinking, an attempt to gain a view of the whole, logical analysis of language 
and clarifying of ideas, and a group of specific problems. Giarelli and Chambliss (1988), 
on the other hand, organize their definition of philosophy around the goals of clarity 
(logical accuracy and focus), context (the building and understanding of the entire 
qualitative situation under investigation), and consciousness (a grasping of the problem 
and the need for problem-solving action).  
Though these four views use somewhat different language and have a somewhat 
different focus, they represent, generally, the essence of philosophic work. That essence 
is captured clearly and succinctly in the following “working definition” of philosophic 
method: “the analysis, clarification, and criticism of the language, concepts, and logic of 
the ends and means of human experience” (Sherman, 1995, p. 2). This definition 
characterizes the “what” and the “how” of philosophic method; the conceptual and 
qualitative nature of philosophical research method. 
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The Philosopher’s Toolbox 
 
The first three terms of the above working definition indicate the tools or 
instruments or the doings of philosophy. That is, philosophers “analyze,” “clarify,” and 
“criticize.” In analysis, one reduces complex ideas or explicates human situations into 
understandable, relational concepts. Through analysis, essential concepts that drive 
practice are extracted from the “boom and buzz” of experience so that they may be more 
easily understood and debated. Closely related to analysis is clarification. All too often 
we simply take for granted or assume that humans have common experiences that lead to 
commonly held understandings of what we communicate to each other. We are, after all, 
thrown into the same world with many already established, taken for granted ideas of 
what is entailed in human experience. One responsibility philosophers have is to 
challenge and ultimately clarify those constructs we use to make sense of the world; 
constructs often taken for granted rather than clarified and truly understood. The final 
tool found in the traditional philosophical toolbox is criticism. Criticism means making 
judgments as to value. Philosophers judge the instrumental/practical value of those 
concepts (do they work, and if not, how can we improve them?) for driving practice and 
in that critical, interpretive mode build new and better conceptual understandings. (It is 
well to note here that speculation might very well be the impetus for this better 
understanding; clearly it is a tool for building better conceptual understanding). The 
philosopher’s tools allow him or her to investigate and then “mediate” experience and 
thereby formulate solutions to problems; problems of a specific type. It is also clear that 
in “extracting” conceptual constructs that drive actual practice (rather than from some 
imagined practice), philosophy is a very qualitative, experiential method.  
 
The Philosopher’s Garden 
 
Just as any type of researcher applies their specific tools to particular types of 
problems, the philosopher-as-social-practitioner has his or her own set of objects on 
which the above tools are used. The second part of our working definition clearly 
indicates the philosopher’s objects of inquiry. Philosophers apply their traditional tools to 
the “language” (how we write and talk about human experience), the “concepts” (the 
ideas), and the “logic” (the relationships between the way we think, write, and talk) of 
human experience. In applying the traditional philosophical tools to these important 
aspects of lived experience, philosophers provide insights into what, why, and how 
ideology directs our decision making process. A philosopher, when doing good work, 
provides a reasonable understanding of how language, logic and concepts are used and 
how they might be improved to create a more just and humane society.  
Finally, our working definition concludes with the words “means” and “ends” of 
human experience. That is, philosophy attempts to make clear the way we think about 
human experience so that reasonable action (means) might evolve which can lead us to 
just and good socially established goals (ends) within the human experience. We do, after 
all, hope to make decisions and take action based on sound conceptual understanding. 
Philosophers investigate real problems that might be alleviated through further 
conceptual understanding. It is, in this regard, a social practice that is very qualitative in 
nature and one, as a social practice, on par with other, more widely accepted, research 
practices.  
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So . . . What’s All the Fuss? 
 
It all sounds quite simple. One must wonder why there has been so much fuss 
over the perceived “death of philosophy.” Surely, seen in the right light, philosophy is 
meaning making, all-encompassing, visionary, open-ended, and therefore, a useful, 
relevant research method for understanding experience. However, the fuss remains and 
has some historical merit: philosophical research is, and has been for nearly one hundred 
years, perceived as irrelevant.  As long as philosophers stray from human experience and 
operate solely in the realm of internal philosophical means and ends (means and ends that 
are relevant only to the study of philosophy itself), philosophical research will continue 
to be viewed (and accurately so) as irrelevant and impractical. As long as philosophers 
refuse to test their findings in experience, we will continue to be viewed as cloud-bound 
practitioners with very little to say about the “boom and buzz” of life as other research 
methods clearly do. This question of relevance, in fact, goes to the heart of our second 
question: why should philosophy be accepted into the qualitative research method 
community?  
“Abstract” is the term I should have used in the examination, and it is the concept 
upon which the question of why philosophy should be seen as a viable method turns. To 
answer that question is to show that philosophy not only has a methodological structure 
similar (if not identical) to other research, but to also show its relevance to experience 
generally and its relationship to other forms of research specifically. In other words, why 
do philosophical research? John Dewey understood the importance of this question and 
spent much of his career dealing with it. 
In his introduction to Experience and Nature, Dewey (1958) explains that 
philosophy is a research method grounded in human experience. Following a discussion 
framing the question of experience as it relates to science, he states the present problem, 
the perceived irrelevance of philosophy, in the following way: “The charge that is 
brought against non-empirical methods of philosophizing is not that it depends upon 
theorizing, but that it fails to use refined, secondary products as a path pointing and 
leading back to something in primary experience” (p. 6). That is, philosophers do indeed 
get their initial research material from lived experience; yet, they often refuse to make 
their findings relevant by explaining how new insights gained through philosophic 
research make any difference to actual practice. In Reconstruction in Philosophy (in 
which he advocates a new view of philosophy as a scientific, experimental, method), 
Dewey (1920) makes the point even more powerfully: 
 
This change of human disposition toward the world does not mean that 
man ceases to have ideals, or ceases to be primarily a creature of the 
imagination. But it does signify a radical change in the character and 
function of the ideal realm which man shapes for himself. In the classic 
philosophy, the ideal world is essentially a haven in which man finds rest 
from the storms of life; it is an asylum in which he takes refuge from the 
troubles of existence with the calm assurance that it alone is supremely 
real. When the belief that knowledge is active and operative takes hold of 
men, the ideal realm is no longer something aloof and separate; it is rather 
that collection of imagined possibilities that stimulates men to new efforts 
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and realizations. It still remains true that the troubles which men undergo 
are the forces that lead them to project pictures of a better state of things. 
But the picture of the better is shaped so that it may become an 
instrumentality of action, while in the classic view the Idea belongs ready-
made in a noumenal world. Hence, it is only an object of personal 
aspiration or consolation, while to the modern, an idea is a suggestion of 
something to be done or of a way of doing. (p. 118) 
 
That is, the concepts, language, and logic that philosophers take as their subjects 
of study, are in fact relevant life qualities and the philosopher’s tools are practical 
instruments for making life better. It is in the analysis, modification and application of 
these subjects (concepts, language, and logic) as they work in qualitative living that 
makes philosophy relevant and explains why it is so important to view philosophy as a 
viable research method. 
 
Philosophic Method as a Relevant Mode of Research: the Specifics 
 
The specific relevance philosophical method has for me is in the investigation of 
public education. I am, in practice, an assistant professor of education (yes, I managed to 
not only survive the qualifying examination but the dissertation process as well!) and it is 
with educational thinking that I must be particularly concerned when it comes to 
understanding philosophic method. To get at its special relevance to public education, 
one need only to replace the phrase “human experience” in our working definition with 
the more limiting phrase “education” to see exactly what philosophy’s role in education 
should be. As the questioners, protectors, and adjusters of educational thinking, 
philosophers play a very practical role in bringing to light and then addressing basic 
ideological conflicts; and, more importantly, because it is in education that broad social 
ideological questions appear, are debated, and ultimately passed on or jettisoned, 
philosophy is especially essential to educational endeavors. That is why Dewey (1916) 
argued that philosophy is, when understood correctly, the general theory of education. 
Philosophy is, indeed, relevant to educational practice.     
As to philosophic method’s relevance to other forms of research, I believe there 
exists (or should exist) an especially important and cozy relationship between philosophy 
and other research--one that is often forgotten or even resisted on the part of both 
philosophers and other researchers. (That is, in fact, the reason I have submitted this 
discussion to a journal dedicated to qualitative research, rather than to one dedicated to 
philosophy.) Philosophers have the particularly important chore of clarifying our thinking 
as to constructs that both clarify experience and direct practice. That methodological 
purpose is important not simply as a means for philosophers to understand concepts, 
language, and logic as they operate in real, lived, experience, but it provides a necessary 
discussion that can become the bases for other kinds of research. It is difficult to imagine 
successful research that is not based on clear philosophical understanding. It is equally 
difficult to imagine successful philosophizing that isn’t, at least sometimes, put to the test 
by researchers and practitioners using other research methodologies. The two simply 
must go hand-in-hand if we are to improve educational practices. 
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A Relevant Research Example in Education 
 
An example of how I think philosophy can meet the demands of relevancy in 
educational research might help to clarify the position outlined here. A few days after 
beginning work at Southwest Missouri State University, I was asked to present at a 
symposium on “Best Practices in Service-Learning.” The reason that I was asked is 
simple: my dissertation study was a philosophical clarification of service-learning 
education and there remains among practitioners substantial conceptual confusion about 
some components of service-learning. My dissertation work on service-learning was the 
result of several years of running a service-learning program at a high school in central 
Florida and my own confusion as to why it only “sort of” worked.  
As I reflected on possible reasons why my program was not as successful as it 
should have been, it slowly dawned on me that I truly did not understand the different 
concepts entailed in the service-learning approach to teaching and learning. As I 
researched further, I found that there was very little in the way of conceptual support 
within the service-learning “community.” One component of service-learning that is a 
continual conceptual bugaboo for practitioners is reflection. The fact of the matter is that 
many (probably most) teachers working under the service-learning pedagogy assume that 
reflection is a simple matter of “looking back” that people of all ages, backgrounds, and 
ability, by nature, simply “do.” That assumption is clearly a mistake.  
Reflection is essential to success with the service-learning pedagogy and not 
understanding its complicated conceptual structure (as well as some other, equally 
complex components) can lead to poorly run service-learning projects and can result in 
poorly run service-learning research. How, for example, can you investigate whether 
students are learning to reflect better through service-learning if it is unclear how 
reflection is to be understood in the particular context of teaching and learning? Clearly 
this is precisely the type of question that calls for philosophic research method as it is 
described here. The research to be done is to clarify reflection and its relationship to 
other components of service-learning and then to put that understanding to the test by 
using it to design and implement a service-learning project. The symposium provided me 
the opportunity to clarify the concept of reflection and explain its “place” in the service-
learning pedagogy. More importantly, it will begin a debate about reflection and 
(hopefully) other concepts that drive service-learning; a debate that can only improve 
practice. For my talk to have met the demands of relevancy outlined here, it must provide 
a conceptual structure that is helpful for building successful reflection into existing and 
future service-learning projects. It must be tested in a service-learning experience and 
then be further investigated through other research methods as well as philosophic 
method to see if the new and improved conceptual understanding has indeed improved its 
practice. In this example can be seen all the methodological characteristics described 
above: it is a conceptual analysis that comes out of real practice and its findings will 
provide clarity that is important to both further research (of the same and other types) and 
to improvements in that practice. It is, in this way, a vital qualitative research method. 
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My Felt Problem Solved 
 
The question of what philosophical method entails is one that is far from dead. 
One only has to read Richard Rorty’s (1982) article “Philosophy in America Today,” or 
Kenneth Seeskin’s (1980) “Never Speculate, Never Explain” to get a feel for the meta-
philosophical “discussion” that began decades ago and continues to this day. In the end, 
however, there is the hope that philosophy can once again be the vibrant research activity 
that John Dewey described it to be. Stephen Toulmin (1988), in “The Recovery of 
Practical Philosophy,” not only clearly traces the history of philosophy relative to the 
charge of irrelevancy, but also calls for a return to a before-1630 vision of what 
philosophical inquiry should be. In the article, Toulmin (1988) calls for a philosophy 
which again takes into account the “oral,” the “particular,” the “local,” and the “timely.” 
This is neither the time nor the place to explicate his entire discussion of the plight of 
philosophical inquiry. It is, however, important to note that Toulmin’s argument is a call 
to return philosophy to its birthplace as a practical method grounded in the qualitative 
human experience.  
It must be made clear that philosophical research, as a social practice, does 
include an important meta-philosophical component. Clearly MacIntyre’s (1984) 
conception of a social practice includes a responsibility to ensure the soundness of the 
practice (philosophy) itself. That is, as a social practice, philosophy must engage in meta-
philosophy if it is to be viable and grow in its own right. However, to get philosophy’s 
proper place back as an essential qualitative, foundational research method, emphasis on 
its external relevance rather than internal workings must become the focus of 
philosophical inquiry. Jonas Soltis (1988) has argued for just such a view of philosophic 
method particularly on the part of educational philosophers:  
 
We [philosophers of education] need substantive contact with educational 
researchers, professional educators of educators and practitioners to keep 
our minds open to potentially relevant philosophical problems, issues, or 
ideas. In fact, relevance of what we do to education must be the sine qua 
non of our professional commitment. It cannot be otherwise if we are 
honestly to call ourselves philosophers of education. (p. 12) 
 
Unfortunately, this is not a universally (or even widely) accepted sentiment.1  
 
 In the final analysis, philosophy is a very human enterprise with very real, human 
consequences. It was from within the human experience that philosophy was born and it 
is into the human experience that philosophy must always return if it is to remain a vital 
and relevant social practice. William James (1975) described philosophy as “prospective” 
(p. 53). Indeed it is, for without conceptual clarity we can neither see where we want to 
go nor how to get there. I think John Dewey (1920) best expressed the relevance of 
philosophy as a practical qualitative research method when he summed up his thoughts in 
Reconstruction in Philosophy:  
                                                          
1 One such argument against Soltis’ comes from Harvey Siegel (1988) who 
writes, “I have already suggested that it is a mistake for philosophers of education to 
strive to be relevant, even if they wish their work to eventuate in the improvement of 
practice” (p. 15). 
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When it is acknowledged that under disguise of dealing with ultimate 
reality, philosophy has been occupied with the precious values embedded 
in social traditions, that it has sprung from a clash of social ends and from 
a conflict of inherited institutions with incompatible contemporary 
tendencies, it will be seen that the task of future philosophy is to clarify 
men’s ideas as to the social and moral strife of their own day. Its aim is to 
become so far as is humanly possible an organ for dealing with these 
conflicts. That which may be pretentiously unreal when it is formulated in 
metaphysical distinctions becomes intensely significant when connected 
with the drama of the struggle of social beliefs and ideals. Philosophy 
which surrenders its somewhat barren monopoly of dealings with Ultimate 
and Absolute Reality will find a compensation in enlightening the moral 
forces which move mankind and in contributing to the aspirations of men 
to attain to more ordered and intelligent happiness. (p. 94) 
 
I now rest easy in knowing that philosophy is a viable, practical, qualitative 
method of educational research. 
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